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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE N. ANDERSON and Wife
IMOGENE T. ANDERSON,
LORENZO W. ANDERSON heretofore
known as LORENZO W. ANDERSON, Jr.
and Wife HAZEL M. ANDERSOS,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
No. 8801
vs.
MARIE T. JOHNSON and
CHESTER N. JOHNSON,
Defendants and Appellants
RES.PONDENTS'

BRIEF

PRELil\tiiNARY STATEMENT
Mr. Young says that two matters are involved in this
appeal, one of which he claims is the transfer of the cause
from Box Elder County to Cache C-ounty on a motion made
for a change of venue and he having treated that matter
first, we shall do likewise.
We deny that the order transferring the trial from
Box Elder County to Cache County is erroneous and void.
We further declare that if counsel for plaintiff felt that it
was unjust his remedy was appeal and had to be perfected
within the statutory time after the granting of the order.
Also, that when he appeared in court in Logan and proceeded to trial without objection, that he thereby waived any
objection to the jurisdiction of the court and having accepted
its jurisdiction is bound by its decision. Also, if conflcting affidavits are filed those in favor of the prevailing party will be taken as true c.nd the facts therein stated will be
as established; and if a rational inference can
considered
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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be drawn in favor of the course pursued by the lower court,
its action will be affirmed.
ARGUMENT ON CH.A.NGE OF VENUE
In regard to the change of venue. The notice and motion for change of venue (Rec. 11 and 12) were served upon
counsel for the defendants on the 31st of July, 1952, and
with the motion were filed affidavits (Rec. 13 to 17) in SUPport of said motion. At said hearing Mr. Young filed counter affidavits (Rec. 18 to 21 )· At the end of the hearing
(Rec. 77) the Court said:

"The Court will take judicial knowledge of the condition of the country with reference to the use of the word
"Communist". I believe that in most of our communities many Comn1unists have been pointed out and words
passed around that certain individuals are Communists. I can refer you to a number in my home town
that people clain1 are Communists that I have never met
or seen, but I know where they live and who they are,
and I believe that that would prejudice a person from
having a fair trial if a person on the jury thought he
was a Communist, particularly where the issue involved him and some of the members of his family that
they may think are not Communists, and I believe the
court should protect a man and do what he can to grant
a fair trial. Under the affidavits that have been filed
with reference to the subject of Communism, the (!ourt
is of the opinion that the motion should be granted,
even in view of the hardship that has been described the
motion is granted and it's ordered that the case be
transferred to Logan for trial in this District. Recess
court."
The Clerk made the following order for change of venue
(Rec. 22):
August Term, 1952. Tuesday, the twelfth day of
August, 1952.
Hon. Joseph G. Jeppson, Presiding.
No. 6859
George N. Anderson, and
Imogene T. Anderson, et al.,
Plaintiff,
-vsMarie T. Johnson and Chester
N. Johnson,
Defendants
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ORDER CHANGE OF VENUE

The motion for change of Venue before the court at
this time. George N. Anderson of the plaintiffs present in court with counsel Walter G. Mann, Esq., and
Marie T. Johnson, one of the defendants present in
court with counsel L. Roy B. Young. Opening statement made to the court by counsel for plaintiff and
defendant. Plaintiff counsel calls George N. Anderson, sworn and testifies is cross examined by defense
counsel. Defense counsel calls Marie T. Johnson,
sworn and testified is cross examined. The matter is
argued and submitted to the court for decision. The
motion for change of venue is granted and the case
Ordered transferred to Cache County for trial. (Minute Book 23, page 95).
Thereafter counsel for plaintiff prepared a written order of
change of venue to be signed by Judge Joseph G. Jeppson
and delivered the original and copy to the court to be forwarded to him at which time Judge Lewis Jones made certain written notations in the order and signed the order
himself (Rec. 23). On the 21st day of August, 1952. the
Clerk of the District Court of Box Elder County sent to
LeRoy B. Young Esq., Attorney at Law, First Security
Bank Building, Ogden, Utah, a copy of said order. Consequently we have an oral order granted on the 12th of
August by Judge Jeppson; a written order for the purpose
of reducing said oral order to writing signed by Judge Lewis
Jones on the 20th day of August and notice of it given to
LeRoy B. Young on the 21st day of August.
Attorney Young cites rule 63A which reads:
DISABILITY. If by reason of death, sickness, or other
disability, a judge before whom an action has been tried
is unable to perform the duties to be performed by the
court under these rules after verdict is returned or
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are filed, then
any other judge regularly sitting in or assigned to the
court in which the action was tried may perform those
duties; but if such other judge is satisfied that he cannot perform those duties because he did not preside at
the trial qr for any other reason, he may in his discretion grant· a new trial.''
3
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The record is silent "\Vhy Judge Jones signed the order and
a presumption arises in favor of its validity. The question
might also arise, "Is it necessary to reduce the oral order
to writing?" We find under Corpus Juris Vol. 67 page 206.
Art. 346 the following:

"FORM AND C·ONTENTS :-The order may be in writin or oral, and it is not essential that it be signed. The
order must comply 'vith the statute, but a substantial
compliance is sufficient. Mere clerical mistakes do
not invalidate the .order nor deprive the court to which
the cause is sent of juris diction. The order must
specify the County to which the cause is sent and show
the caus·e for making it, but should not state the name
of the Judge to try the case, nor need it fix a time for
trial. The order should also show by whom it is requested, that it is supported by affidavit, and that in
the court's opinion the cause for change is good.''
The oral order of Judge Jeppson, mentioned above, met
everyone of these requirements. VoL 5.6 of American Jr.
Pr. Art. 76 page 77 in regard to an order for the change of
venue in effect reads as follows:
"ORDER FOR CHANGE AND EFFECT THEREOF:A change of venue is ordinarily made by a formal order
of the court designating the county to which the change
is to be made, but may, for some causes at least, such
as that the action was instituted in the wrong county,
be made by order of the judge at chambers. An order
may be effective to work a change of venue even though
it does not specifically provide therefor or designate
formally the county to which it is changed. It is undoubtedly the better practice to designate the county,
but the omission to employ such explicit words will not
work a reversal where it is entirely clear"that the venue
was in fact changed. The court to which change of
venue is awarded is not '¥ithout jurisdiction because
of a clerical error in the order reciting that the venue
of the cause is changed, which uses the words "court"
instead of "cause". An entry nunc pro tunc of an order
of change of venue at a term subsequent to that in which
the order was made is proper in a case where the omission of the entry of the proper term was due to negligence in the Clerk. Although an accused has a right
to be present at proceedings against him, it is not error
for a court to grant a l.:hange of venue upon the request
of the defendant in a f~lon? case, in his absence."
4
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And this san1e article goes on and discusses the matter. It
further showing that if the parties, after the order was
made, proceed to trial that they then submit to the venue
and the court takes jurisdiction. Record 84 shows that the
parties appeared on the 1st day of December, 1952, in the
court in Logan. 1\fr. Young made no objection to the jurisdiction of the court, but proceeded at once to assist in
the drawing of a jury for jury duty, and the case was then
tried.
Mr. Young says the order is an appealable order and
cites certain cases. We w~ll agree that the order is appealable. One of the first cases in which this matter was In Re.
Whitmore 35 Pac. 524. Then in the left hand column at the
bottom of Page 525, it says:
"It appears that the First District Court, at Provo,
made an order in this case, December 27, 1892, which
reads as follows: "In this case the court on its own
motion, orders, that this case to be transferred to the
Third District Court, at Salt Lake City, for further proceedings." - - - - Our statute authorizes the court to
change the place of trial upon its own motion, if the
parties do not agree, hut in that case the cause must be
transferred to the nearest court. The presumption follows that the parties did not agree, and that there was
good cause known by the judge for the transferring
of the cause to the Third District Court."
In the Whitmore case the parties met and proceeded with
their hearing through a referee, no objection being made to
the juris diction of the court, similar to ours. Then in the
middle of the page 525, in the right hand column, the court
said:
"The order changing the place of trial from the First
District Court was an appealable order, and, if erroneous, an appeal was the proper remedy to correct it."
Another early case on the same subject matter was Elliot vs.
Whitmore et al, 37 Pac. page 461, and was determined on
5
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the same state of facts.
Our statute Sec. 78-13-11 Utah Code Annotated 1953,
reads:
"Duty of Clerk-Fees and costs-Effect on j urisdiction :-When an order is made transferring an action
or proceeding for trial, the court must transmit thP
pleadings and papers therein to the court to which it i~
transferred. The costs and fees therefor and filing the
papers anew must be paid by the party at whose instance the order was made ; provided, that when such
order is made for the reason that the cause was com.
menced in the wrong county, the costs of transfer and
filing the papers anew shall be paid by the plaintiff
in the action within ten days after making of such
order, or said cause shall be dis,missed for want of jurisdiction. The court to which an action or proceeding is
transferred shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction as if it had been originally commenced therein.''
'!'his s,ection was taken from the California Code Art. No.
399, (25 Cal. Jur. Pr. Art. 45 page 913.) And the time for
appeal is the statutory time to appeal any judgment, which
in our case is one month, as determined in the matter of
Chase vs. Superior Court et al, 99 Pac. 355. Under 25 Cal.
Jur. Article 50 page 918, we have:
"APPEAL AS STAY:-Under Section 949 of the Code
of Civil Procedure an appeal from an order refusing to
change the place of trial, or from an order changing the
place of trial, does not operate to stay procedings in the
lower court. But inasmuch as an appellate court has
authority to make all orders or judgments necessary to
render effectual its judgment on appeal fro1n an order
denying the change, upon a reversal of such an order
it may reverse a judgment rendered in the case by the
lower court, although the appellant may have appeared at
the trial and contested the right of the respondent to
recover."
In other words Mr. Young cites certain rules where judgments must be signed by the judge and filed with the clerk
and certain rules defining a judgment, but he failed to cite
Rule 73A which is as follows:
6
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"When an appeal is pern1itted from a District Court to
the Supreme Court, the time in which an appeal may be
taken shall be one month from the entry of the judgment appealed from unless a shorter time is provided
by law, - - - - "
Then again on the question of appeal, in 25 Cal. Jur. Art. 51
page 918:
"REVIEW ON APPEAL :-All presumptions upon appeal are in favor of an order changing the place of trial.
It follows that where the motion was made upon two
grounds, one of which is sufficient to sustain the action
of the court in granting the motion, the order will not
be disturbed. And, in accordance with the general
rule that the action of a trial court will be upheld where
there is substantial evidence to support it, it is held
that an order based upon conflicting affidavits, either
in granting or refusing a change of venue, will not be
disturbed. When the affidavits are conflicting those
in favor of the prevailing party will be taken as true,
and the facts stated therein will be considered as established; and if a rational inference can be drawn in
favor of the course pursued by the lower court, its action will be affirmed.
If the plaintiff in the lower court presses the action for trial, although the defendant claims that the
case is one which, under the constitution, should have
been commenced in another couty, he cannot successfully contend on appeal that the superior court of the
county where the action was tried did not have jurisdiction.''
See the many cases cited thereunder.
It appears to the writer that Mr. Young takes this attitude in his attempt to oppose the order asking for a change
of venue: That rather than appeal from that order he
would go to trial without further objection and run his
chance on trying to be successful. If he failed then he
would drop back and say that the court did not have a right
to hear the case, even though he submitted himself to its
jurisdiction. And even thougQ-~the statute under which he
is proceeding says (Sec. 78-13-11 Utah Code Annotated

1953):
7
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ferred shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction as
if it had been originally commenced therein."
"The court to which an action or proceeding is transThen the question comes up, "Can he do this?" There is a
Kansas case in point being City of Garden City vs. Heller
Sup. Court of Kansas, May 5, 1900. 60 Pac. 1060. This
case was begun in Finney County of which Garden City
forms a part and it was sent to Edwards County upon application for change of venue. In the right hand column page
1060 we have:
"The record does not affirmatively show that an order
granting the change was made, and it is contended that
the absence of a formal order defeats the jurisdiction.
It does not appear that the application was made; that
the files and papers in the case were thereupon transmitted to the District Court of Edwards County; that
both parties appeared there, and the City submitted
itself to the jurisdiction of that court; that the trial
resulted in favor of the City, and the plaintiff prosecuted error and obtained a reversal. The objection that
the change of venue was irregularly made came after
all these steps, and was too late. While the record is
silent as to the ordering of a change, "all presumptions
from silence on the part of the record should be construed in favor of the regularity and validity of tpe proceeding of the court, and not against the regularity and
validity of such pr.oceedings." Hunters Adm'R vs.
Fergusons Adm'R 13 Kansas 462). However, it is not
necessary to rest the decision of the point upon mere
presumption. When the change was made the defen-dant did not make a timely objection, but, instead recognized the validity of the proceedings in obtaining a
change, and fully submitted itself to the jurisdiction of
the court. 'I'he City asked and obtained a favorable
. judgment without protest or objection, and must be held
to have waived the irregularity, or any question as to
the proper transfer of the case." See cases cited therein.
In Otero Canal Company vs. Fosdick, a Colorado case found
in 39 Pac. 332, where a questfon of change of venue came up,
and on page 333 in the lower right hand column we find:
8
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"It is, however, entirely unnecessary for us to consider
the question as to whether or not the County Court
erred in changing the venue to the District Court. It
is sufficient, for the purpose of this case, to know that
the parties entered a general appearance in the District
Court, filed amended pleadings and proceeded to trial
without objection, - - - - ''
In the matter of the J. J.lVIayou Manufacturing Company vs.
Consumers Oil and Refining Co., a Wyoming case found in
146 Pac. 2d 738. The action was brought in one county
and plaintiff filed a motion to take the case to another county. The court ordered the change, but the clerk sent only
certified copies of the proceedings. The case was tried and
no objection was made to the jurisdiction of the court until
on appeal. They had a statute similar to ours \vhich stated
that after the papers were transferred and filed the court
had the same jurisdiction as if originally filed in that court.
(See the right hand column page 750) The court held any
irregularities were waived by the appearance without objection and then going to the trial. Numeous other cases
are cited therein.
There is also the recent case of Daiki Otsuka vs. Balangue et al, a California case 208 P. 2d 65, \vhich were appeals
from the order denying the motion for a change of venue.
This case is cited to show that the granting of a change of
venue is an order which is appealable, and the time at which
the appeal commences to run is the same as on any other appeal. to-wit: one month.
In regard to the affidavits and evidence offered. It is
like Judge Jeppson said: The condition of the country is
such that any mention of the word "Communism" is such
that a person who had been charged with such a title has
little chance of a fair trial. That the jury that tried the
case had that before them was evident by the fact that one
of the jury told the plaintiff, George N. Anderson (Rec. 72
line 7) of him being considered a communist as follows.
9
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"Mr. Beecher told me that he understood from what my
sister was telling around town that I was a communist,
therefore he had no sympathy with me on the trial.'
The writer, in his affidavit (Rec. 16) reports a very
flagrant assertion made to him in a public place about a representation to the effect that two of the plaintiffs, George
N. Anderson and wife, were ''Communists." It \vas common talk and extremely touchy, and the court so found and
cons,equently granted the motion.
In regard to the proposition that the evidence does not
support the judgment or minute entry, we have already
cited 25 Cal. Jur. Art. 51, but in closing wish to cite Vol. 56
Am. Jr. Art. 73 and that part found on page 73:
"----The majority rule, however seems to be that the
grant or refusal of a change of venue upon a ground
other than that of brniging the action in the wrong
county reposes in the sound discretion of the judge presiding over the court, and that a party to an action does
not comply with the statutory formalities respecting
applications for a change of venue thereby become entitled to a change as a matter of right, but, on the contrary, he must satisfy the court of the actual existence
of the ground alleged, as justifying the change sought.
His application is addressed to the discretion of the
judge, whose ruling thereon will not be disturbed by an
appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears
from the record - - - - - "
Also Art. 74 and. quoting from page 75:
"- - - - - However, the more stringent rule sometimes
prevails that since a change of venue is left largely to
the discretion of the trial court, its ruling thereon will
not be disturbed unless it appears from the facts presented that the court acted unfairly and committed a
palpable abuse of a sound discretion, or as it is sometimes stated, unless it is made clearly to appear that
there has been such an abuse of discretion as to amount
practically to a denial of justice. - - - -".
CONCL,USION ON CHANGE OF VENUE

Consequently we contend and submit that a valid judgment
or order was made in the first instance ; that the evidence
does support it; that the defendants having submitted them10
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selves to the jurisdiction of the Cache County Court and
having failed to appeal within the statutory time allowed
by law from the order for change of venue, cannot now
raise any question to the jurisdiction of the Cache County
Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS O·N THE MERITS
Counsel for plaintiffs cannot agree with Mr. Young's
statement of facts and list hereafter their statement with
the appropriate references to the record. !But before beginning and due to the fact that Mr. Young has intimated and
implied in his brief, page 19, that Judge Jones might have
found for his client when he says :
"The court (with tongue in cheek) over-ruled these motions but stated that had he been trying the case without a jury he would have found the issues in favor of
the defendants." (Tr. 434)
He didn't go on to say that while Judge Jones had his tongue
in his cheek that he also said, (R. 434):
"But I can't bring myself to say that there is not a substantial conflict in the evidence. ----I still think there
was sufficient evidence there to go to the jury. -- -- I
also want to comment in the record in this case in view
of the charge made that the jury in this case was
biased and prejudiced in favor of the plaintiffs, that the
court can see no evidence of this jury over here in
Cache County being moved by passion and prejudice to
reach the verdict that it did. On the contrary, the
court feels that the jury acted without passion and prejudice in arriving at the verdict."
"I also want to say in the record, the issues raised
by the parties and the arguments of the parties to the
jury and the evidence didn't touch on the main issue
which the jury passed on, as I see it, and that is whether
there should be an equal distribution, in the background,
of this estate as an inchoate matter of equitable justice between the children, and not from favoritism to
one child who was able to get possession of the body of
the grantor before he died and obtain certain favors.
And although a hundred new trials were granted it's
my opinion that no jury in Cache County or Box Elder
County or any other county under those circumstances
would reach a different result. It is to be noted, of
11
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course, that in the Box Elder County trial, the court
was lulled into an erroneous construction of the dead
man's statute, and the two brothers were not permitted
to testify to certain matters. So the order may be as
indicated.''
Lorenzo W. Anderson \vas the father of the plaintiff's,
George N. Anderson and Lorenzo W. Anderson Jr., and the
defendant Marie 'T. Johnson. He was a widower in the year
1943 and had been for many years last past and was 68 years
of age (R. 242). He was the owner of the following property: A home in which he lived in Brigham City; a home
in Brigham C'ity called the Christensen place; a farm and
pasture in Garland; a dry farm in Promontory, Utah, consisting of 432. acres and a building lot in Brigham City, Utah,
at the back of the home in which he resided.
In March of 1943 he made out three deeds to his three
children. The son George was given the Christensen place
in Brigham City and an undivided one third (1/3) interest
in Promontory. The son Lorenzo was given the Garland
farm, the building lot back of the father's home and an undivided one third (1/3) interest in Promontory. The daughter Marie was given the father's home place and an undivided one third (1/3) interest in Promontory. The father retained the pasture in Garland. This covered all of the property that he then owned.
The son George first heard of these deeds shortly after
they were made up. He was living in Brigham City at the
time and had the father to supper. (Rec. 219). While there
the father told George and his wife about the deeds and invited them back to the house. The three of them went to
the house and in the front room on the table were three
deeds. The father told them what each deed contained and
then (Rec. 220 line 21) :
"He took this deed and held it out and said, "I want you
both to take it." So we reached out and both of us took
the deed. He says, uNow, each of you handle it and
look at it," which \Ve did. And then he explained, he
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said, "I'm giving you this deed 'vith the understanding
that I \vould like to have the revenues from my proper·
ty as long as I live." He said, "Now you can record this
deed if you want to, but I wish you wouldn't until after
I die. At which time, he said, ''I would like you three
children to come and get your deeds together. Each of
you will then know that the other was getting so that
there would be no feelings.'' (Underlining added).
The father explained to them (Rec. 221) that the deeds
would be kept in a cubby hole of the family desk. It was
\\t·ritten in the father's handwriting and it had been witnessed and notarized. This family desk was described by
Lorenzo as follows (Rec. 192. line 12):
"A. I said it was a roller top desk with dra\vers on the
sides, on each side. There were three drawers on the
left side. My drawer was the top one, Marie's the center, George's is the bottom one. On thP right &ide was
a double drawer about that big.
Q. When you say "that big" it doesnt go into that record.
A. Approximately a foot deep. And then a smaller
drawer underneath. Dad kept his protractor and drafting equipment, drawing paper and such items as that
in the double drawer. Then up in the back of the desk
were four little drawers. George's drawer was the one
on the left, Marie's in the center, and mine was third
from the left. The fourth one Dad I think used for
keeping papers or letters or something in. Then over
beyond these small drawers on the back of the desk was
this cubby hole. There was a key that was always left
in the cubby hole because when you'd close the door it
wouldn't stay closed unless you locked it. So the key
was left in there so we all had access to it. T'he key
was there. We could unlock it any time we wanted to."

The son Lorenzo first heard about the deeds in the
spring of 1943 while he was working for the F.B.I. in the
Western part of South Dakota, at which time the father
wrote a Jetter to him (Rec. 86) and told him that he had
deeded the property to his three children. In October of
1944 the father visited with his son Lorenzo in St. Paul at
which time they discussed the deeds (Rec. 87). At that
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meeting the son advised the father that he was making a
mistake in deeding the property to his children without reserving a life estate but the father said he did not want a
life estate and gave his reasons, and said:
"I trust you three children. I know you're not going to
record the deeds until I die and that you are going to let
me have the property to manage and keep the proceeds
from it."
The son Lorenzo then suggested a will, but the father said
he had already disposed of his property by deeds and that he
did not believe in wills; he asked that the deeds be not recorded until he died. He said that Lorenzo's deed was in
the cubby hole in the desk and that he had given it to Marie
to give to Lorenzo.
In the fall of 1944 the son Lorenzo passed through Salt
Lake City and visited his sister Marie, who was at that time
quite worried about her husband beng drafted into the army
(Rec. 88) and asked Lorenzo if he had any objection if they
went to Brigham City and ran the farms in the hope that her
husband might be deferred and Lorenzo's permission was
given.
It was either while Loenzo was home on this visit, or
the next, that the father introduced him to the tenant of the
Garland farm (Rec. 89) and advised him that Lorenzo was
the owner of it and that when Mr. Anderson died he would
have to do business with Lorenzo. He also, at or about that
time, told others that he was going to deed his property to
his children and that he had so deeded it. (Rec. 268 and
439).
In the spring of 1945, the son Lorenzo made a visit to
Brigham City and a conversation took place between him and
Marie who was then living with her father (Rec. 91). At
that time Marie took Lorenzo into the bedroom where the
deeds were and they examined them and Marie asked Lo·
renzo if he wanted to take his deed with him. (Rec. 92) but
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Lorenzo decided to leave it there in the desk.
In the spring of 1946 the son Lorenzo again returned to
Brigham City and at that time his sister Marie told him that
she was afraid that her brother George was going to try to
get more than his share of the property (Rec. 94) and they
decided to check the deeds again. In the reorcd page 95 line
20, we find:

"A. First of all I checked over the deeds. I checked
mine carefully and then Marie said, "Will you check
mine?" So I looked at hers. Then I said., "Marie, if
there's any question as to the validity of these deeds
we're going to have to prove delivery. Now," I said,
"Dad told me he had given my deed to you to be given
to me," and I said, "Now is that true?' and she said,
"Yes, it is," I said, "Well, I'd like to know right now
whether it's true or not. If it isn't then I'm going to
talk to Dad about it so he can give my deed to me directly." She said, "Dad gave me your deed to be given to
you.
She then got the deed again and handed it to him.
In September of 1946, after the father had had a hea1·t
attack, the family were all home. At that time the brother
George was being transferred to Ogden, Utah, in his work.
He had no place to live and the father suggested that he
move into the Christensen place. It was discussed that a
tenant was in the place at the time, but the father said,
(Rec. 97) "You are the owner of the property and as owner
you can evict this tenant under the o~.P.A. regulations." He
then told George to get his deed and for Lorenzo to go with
him and meet the tenant, show him the deed and ask him
to move. (See also testimony of Lorenzo, Rec. 225).
The tenant moved out and George and his family moved
into the Christensen place. However the house needed a
lot of repair and George wondered about recording his deed.
His father met him at his house and they talked it over (Rec
226). His father told him:
"You can take that deed down and record it, but, Marie
and Lorenzo might feel hu:.--t if you recorded your third
interest
in Promontory at this time."
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It was then decided between them to let the father take the
old deed and make two new ones, one for the Christensen
place and one for Promontory. They later met according to
appointment and the father signed both deeds and Marie
signed them at witness, and witnessed the delivery. (Rec.
228 line 10.) :
"My wife and I were there. My father handed the two
deeds to us at once. This time he never made much
fuss about them. He merely passed them over. I took
them and then my wife took them from me, as I remember. Passing the two deeds at the same time."
The Christensen deed was recorded and the new deed on
Promontory remained in the desk with the other two deeds
and were seen from time to time by different members of
the family. (Rec. 231-232-233).
In the meantime the father had more sickness and the
wives of the brothers Lorenzo and George assisted in the
nursing of Mr. Anderson (Rec. 99). The defendant Marie
on the 16th day of July, 1947, (Rec. 101 Exhibit L-7), sent
a letter to her brother Lorenzo wherein she speaks about the
father being not too alert and that their brother George is
trying to get some advantage. "\Vhereupon Lorenzo telephoned his sister Marie (Rec. 103) from California and on
line 28 we have:
"A. I asked Marie how Dad was and she said that his
condition was getting worse all the time.
Q. What condition?
A. Well, physical and. mental.
Q. Go ahead.
A. And she mentioned that George was trying to get
some money to finish medical school and that he had
asked Dad for some money and Dad had mentioned that
he didnt have any cash on hand, that he'd either have to
mortgage or sell property, and Marie said, "What shall
I d.o ?" she said, "Dad isn't alert enough to be able to
handle the property," So I said, "Marie, take the deeds
down to the Recorder's Office the first thing in the
morning and record them."
Q. What deeds did you sRy to take down?
A. My deed and her deed.
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What did she say to that?
A. She said, "I'll go down the first thing in the morning and record them at the Recorder's Office.

Q.

Instead of recording the deeds as promised, Marie set about
to have her father prepare a will wherein she and her husband could buy the Promontory property for $10,000.00,
even though it was worth $30,000.00 and all within a week
from the time she had reported to her brother that "Dad
isn't alert enough to handle the property."
She prepared in her own handwriting (Exhibit L-1) a
rough draft of the will and took it to her cousin William E.
Davis, an attorney, for preparation on the 23rd day of July,
1947. On her direct testimony she denied having made any
suggestions about the making of the will (Rec. 362) or being present when Attorney Davis talked with her father
(Rec. 362), and on cross examination she claimed she knew
nothing of what the will was to contain until after it was
made (Rec. 390). When shown Exhibit L-1 she admitted
it was in her handwriting, but said the datehad been changed (Rec. 392-3). She even said that she had copied this exhibit after the will had been made and sent it to her brother
Lorenzo (Rec. 395 lines 19 to 22), also (Rec. 196). Yet an
examination of the Exhibit L-1 shows that it is an instruction written by one person to another about the property of
a third person. She admitted that the attorney gave her the
will to read when he brought it to the house (Rec. 399-400)
and then for the first time said:
"Maybe she had been to s·ee him about preparing it."
And then finally, under cross-examination (Rec. 405) admitted she had prepared Exhibit L-1 and delivered it to the attorney for the preparation of the will. She, at the safe time,
to-~'it July 24th, 1947, wrote her brothe1· Lorenzo a letter
(Exhibit L-2) advising him of the will, but says that she is
not going to let her brother Geo.rge-know about it. (Rec.
403). George was to receive nothing under the terms of the
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·will. She therein describes her father's condition as gradually getting worse.
She did not record her deed, or her brother's deed!' as
promised (Rec. 407) nor did she notify her brother that she
had not recorded it. (Rec. 407).
The father had another sick spell in ..c:-\ugust of 1948 and
at that time the son Lorenzo returned home. (Rec. 104).
The brother George had been home in the spring of the year
and at that time the father. hardly knew him, his health was
so poor (Rec. 235) . When Lorenzo was there the father
was bed ridden and fell asleep while Loren·zo and Marie talked.. Marie at that time took the will from a black book,
(R·ec. 104), at which time her brother called it to her attention that she had moved the deeds from the cubby hole and
she said (Rec. 105 line 2):
"Well, I'm keeping the deeds and the will together."
She said, "George doesn't know anything about the will
and I don't want him to know about it.'' So she says,
"I'm keeping them all here in this book."
At that time Marie was told by Lorenzo that he did not be~ieve the will was any good because the father had already
disposed of his property and that the will could be contested.
He then said (Rec. 106 line 2) :
"Do you still have the deeds?" "Oh, yes," she says,
"They're here in the book." And she got the deeds out.
That would be my deed, her deed and George's deed. I
said "Marie, these deeds are good. Don't let anything
happen to them." She said, "Don't worry ,I won't.
Neither of the boys returned home again after the fall
of 1948, until after the father's death. At that time each
boy returned, the first words that they heard from Marie
were, that her Dad had given to her and her husband Promon
tory (R.ec. 238 lines 1 to 8, Rec. 107 lines 1 to 7 and Rec. 255
lines 23 to 28) . A deed had been signed, Exhibit L-25, on
the 7th day of February, 1949, to Promontory to Marie and
her husband and also in.cl uded in the deed was the home and
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the lot that was to go to Lorenzo. A deed (Exhibit L-26)
to the son Lorenzo to the Garland property was also mad.e
out on the same day.
These deeds were executed under rather peculiar circumstances. According to Marie her father was dressed
(Rec. 372) in pants, shirt and slippers. According to J. W.
Phillips, her witness, who acknowledged his signature
(Rec. 316), shoes, shirt and trousers. According to the
brother in law Ellis Demars, who called upon him almost
daily after the first of January, 1949, until his death (Rec.
275) that he was dressed in his robe from day to day and
that he did not remember of ever seeing him dressed after
the first of the year. Also, according to Mari's witness, Dr.
S. L. Moskowitz, from the time of his first attack in August,
1946, he was practically incapacitated until his death (Rec.
329). Also her doctor described what he meant by confusion as that a patient doesn't realize what is going on, would
not know where he was o:t; recognize his own home (Rec.
337-8). Marie admitted that he was irrational at times;
that he didn't recognize his home or them and sometimes
had a blank look on his face (Rec. 404) . His sister Edna
Demars said that at one time he lost his sight and mind and
was paraly""'Zed (Rec. 443). That he didn't recognize his
home (Rec. 444). That she had come to his house where
he's had his most costly books and different people were
there and he said (Rec. 445) :
"You can have them. You can take them home."
And we knew very well he wouldn't part with them for
gold."
His brother in law Ellis Demars took him for several rides
in the spring of the year, just before he died. He took him
to Garland, Utah, to visit his sister in April or May of 1949
(Rec. 275). That Mr. Anderson appeared rational to begin
with; that Mr. Anderson pointed ou the Garland farm and
said that it was now his son Lorenzo's place (Rec. 276);
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that Mr. D·emars asked hin1 if this property was the same
as when he first made his deeds out and he said: "Just the
same." (Rec. 277). This was after the 1949 deeds were
purportedly mad.e. That after they had been there for
awhile he got a vacant stare (Rec. 277 -8) ; that Mr. Demars
had seen this same stare before the first of January, 1949.
That when they started home and passed the Sugar Factory,
he couldn't recognize it and said that they were going in the
wrong direction. They stopped in the town of Elwood and
where he and. Mr. Anderson had surveyed at one time for a
city water line and Mr. Anderson claimed he had never seen
the place before and when the brother in law was asked to
describe how he looked, he said (Rec. 2'78 line 30 and 279
line 1)
"Well, he still had that hazy appearance on his face.
He didn't know vvhere he was at." At another time he took
him through Mantua and Dry Lake, where they had surveyed at one time together, and he saw that he was becoming
confused and when he said that he didn't recognize the place,
he took him home but when he got there Mr. Anderson said
it was not his place and to take him home (Rec. 280). That
he took him for a ride to Perry, a town three miles south
of Brigham City and stopped for a drink of soda water and
he did not recognize the town of Perry or the Perry Meeting
I-Iouse, or the surveying work that they had done around it,
and Mr. Demars took him home. Mr. Demars also describes
his clothing as a robe and slippers and that he had never
seen him dressed otherwise since the first of the year.
(Rec. 281 and 282). That he took him again to Garland and
stopped in Bear River City, the place where Mr. Anderson
was born, but he did not recognize it. When he got back
home, he did not recognize his home (Rec. 283 and 284) ·
He also tells about him trying to give away his valuable
books and in the record at page 286, line 9, we have:
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"Well, on one occasion ,Bishop Petersen at that time,
Fred L. Petersen, he came in and he says, "I want you
to take this book." And Marie, she winked at me and
I just nodded back to her and when the Bishop went out
of the room we just took the book from him and turned
around and put them back on his desk. His old desk
was in the front bedroom at that time."
These deeds, referred to as the 1949 deeds, were executed
during that period of time when he wanted to give something away.
Marie did not advise her brother Lorenzo of any new
deed executed by the father, even though she wrote him a
letter a day after (Exhibit L-28) .. She did not record her
deed until the day before the father died. Her deed is Exhibit L-25. She did not send or give the deed made by her
father in 1949 in favor of Lorenzo, but instead after the funeral gave it to Attorney George M. Mason who demanded
that before he give it up, that both the boys and their wives
sign a Quit Claim Deed to Marie on all of the property that
she got hy the 1949 deeds (Rec. 121 also 240, 241) which
they refused to do.
Mr. Young on page 16 of his brief and in the last of the
second paragraph, said:
"His disposal of this home was displeasing to the deceased.''
The only evidence in the record regarding this is found in
the record at page 419, line 27, when Marie answered,
"He was quite upset when he heard he had sold the
home."
Counsel then objected to it as not responsive to which
the court ordered:
"It's stricken and the jury is instructed to disregard it."
In this regard. Marie did say in the record at poge 419, that
someone else had come in and told her father that George
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had sold the house and that she had not told him. However
when counsel produced a letter written by her (Rec. 421 and
422) (Exhibit L-36), she admitted that she had told the
father of the sale of the Christensen place by George at a
time when she thought thatGeorge was trying to get some
~vantage of her.
The 1943 deeds were burned by Marie (Rec. 256 line 28).
She claimed in her direct testimony (Rec. 376-7) that the
father gave them to her and told her to burn them.
The case was submitted to a jury to decide the question
of delivery of the 1943 deeds, and they were also instructed
to determine if the 1949 deeds were delivered and if so, if
the maker had the mental capacity to make delivery of the
same. (See instructions No. 1 to 15, R.ec. 25 to 32). The
jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of the plaintiffs
on the interrogatories submitted with its instructions (Rec.
33) and the court entered Findings of Fact and COnclusions
of Law and Decree establishing the 1943 deeds.
ARGUMENT ON THE·.'MERITS
The issues in this case raise three primary questions
treated by counsel for the defendants :
1. The question of fact as to whether there was a delivery of the 1943 deeds.
2. The question of fact as to whether Mr. Anderson
was competent at the time of the 1949 deeds, and
3. A question of fact as to the delivery of the 1949
deeds.
This case brings before the Court for the first time, so far
as we know, Rule 39, Subsection C, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as follows:
"Advisory Jury and Trial by Consent: In all actions
not triable of right by a jury the Court upon motion or
of its own initiative may try any issue with an advisory
jury, or, with the consent of both parties may order a
trial with a jury whose verdict has the same effect as if
trial by jury had been a matter of right."
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The action below was tried by a jury on all issues, and
no parties objected to a trial by the jury; so we deem these
facts to justify the statement that it was tried with the consent of both parties and that therefore the verdict, regardless of the form of the action, legal or equitable, has the
same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter of right~
Therefore, if there is any substantial evidence to go to the
jury upon either of the three interrogatories, this Court
'viii affirm the lower court's decision.
Assuming for the purpose of this brief that the new
rules of court neither create nor abolish any jury rights, this
portion of the case will be presented on the basis that there
are mixed questions of law and fact and that legal as well as
equipable relief has been asked. Federal Practice and Procedure, Barron and Holtzoff, Volume 2, page 607, Note 45;
the text treats the rules as rules of common sense where
there are both law and equitable questions raised. We submit that the question of delivery of the 1943 deeds is a legal
question of fact, as is also the question for the recovery of
possesion of real property.
State v. Hart, 26 Utah 229, 72 P. 938. That case held
that the fact that injunctive relief is sought does not deprive either party of his right to have legal issues submitted to a jury.
The cases in Utah on the question of whether or not a
trial is on equitable or legal bases have a long history, practically all of them being cited in the case of Petty vs. Clark.
129 P. 2d 568. Some of the earlier cases held that where
both questions of law or equity were involved, the equitable
issue should he tried first, and the the Court should proceed
with the trial on legal matters. (Park vs. Wilkinson, Utah
60 Pacific 945). The later cases, however, such as the Petty case, try all matters simultaneously; and the legal issues
are submitted to the jury, and the Court determines the
equitable relief to be applied. Some of the earlier Utah
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cases cited in the Petty case, held contrary to the later cases;
but it is apparent that the Petty case overruled these. See
the last paragraph in the concurring opinion of Justice
'Volfe.
The actio:n at bar is an action for the recovery for specific real property, or to establish a right to real property;
and the rule related to the delivery of the deed seems to be
best stated in 26 C. J. S. Page 256 as follows:
"Whether a deed has been delivered and accepted ordinarily involves a mixed question of law and fact to be determined by the jury where the evidence is conflicting;
but the question of what facts, if proved., amount to a
delivery is a question of law."
Therefore, in this case after the Court instructed the jury as
to what acts would be necessary to constitute a delivery, it
left it to the jury to ascertain whether Mr. Anderson had accomplished acts sufficient to amount to a delivery; and the
jury held in favor of the plaintiff. T'he rule in Utah is cited
with approval in the note in 117 A.L.R. Page 3lc:
"Where a statutory suit to quiet title, remove cloud, or
determine advers,e claims to real estate is maintainable,
the parties are as a general rule entitled to a jury trial
if the defendant is in possession even though the statute
does not affirmatively provide for trial by jury."
Park vs. Wilkinson, Utah, 21 Utah 279, 60 Pac. 945, is cited
and discussed under this annotation. At page 38 of the
same annotation, it is stated that generally in most cases
where the parties claim legal title and not merely an equitable title, such as a mortgage, the action is one in law; but
the rule seems to be different in Federal Courts because the
remedy at law is adequate and being entitled to a jury trial
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts. Under
this heading at page 39, the Utah case of Norback vs. Board
of Directors etc., 37 Pac. 2d 339 is cited with approval. In
that case the action was brought to establish an easement
under claim of ownership and for damages. There the Court
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said:
"The primary purpose of the instant case is the establishment of an easement based upon an alleged prescriptive user. If plaintiff fails in this, his cause of action
fails. The right of injunctiYe relief cannot come into existence until the easement has been established."
This issue the plaintiff was entitled to have tried before
a jury. In analyzing that holding, it is apparent that the
plaintiff was entitled to have the jury determine whether or
not he had an easement; and then if he did, the Court would
apply the extraordinary equitable injunctive relief. This
fits exactly into the pattern that we have on this appeal,
namely that we are entitled to have a jury answer the questions as to whether or not there was a delivery of the 1943
deeds. Then if there was, such a delivery, the Court may
apply relief either by partition of the property among the
sons and daughter, or by quieting the title in the respective
parties.
See also Buckley vs. Cox et al recently decided Utah
No. 7730.
The questions involved are now set out in the following
three sections of our Judicial Code in Utah Code Annotated,

1953:
78-21-1. "Right to jury trial - In actions for the r·ecovery of specific real or personal property, with or
without damages, or for money claimed as due upon
contract or as damages for breach of contract, or for injuries, an issue of fact may be tried by a jury, unless a
jury trial is waived or a referee is odrered.
78-21-2. Jury to decide questions of fact- All questions of fact, where the trial is by jury, other than those
mentioned in the next section, are to be decided by the
jury, and all evidence thereon is to be addressed to them,
except when otherwis·e provided.
78-21-3. Court to decide questions of la-"~1 - All questions of law, including the admissibility of evidence, the
facts preliminary to such admission, the construction of
statutes and other writings, and the application of rules
of evidence are to be decided by the court and all dis25
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cussions of law addressed to it. Whenever the knowledge of the court is by law made evidence of a fact, the
court is to declare such knowledge to the jury, vvho are
bound to accept it."
There is not a great deal of difference between the old Code
and the above excerpts from the Judicial Code. The Code
of 1943 carried the old system of disposing of cases by including the following:
"In cases where there are issues of both law and fact,
the issue of law must first be disposed of.'
I do not find this provision in the present Code.
An interesting case is found in the California Court,
Longley vs. Brooks, 92 P. 2d 394. This was a case where
there was a claimed delivery of deeds by the defendant notwithstanding the fact that the grantor retained custody
after delivery. The Court in disposing of the matter on appeal stated.
"In accordance with well-established law, it is clear that
if the findings relating to the delivery of the deed to the
respondent are substantially supported by the evidence,
or if there is a substantial conflict in the evidence upon
which the findings are made to rest, the resulting judgment may not be disturbed.
In any event, the weight to be given the testimony as to
the sealing of the envelope, as well as that of all the
other testimony bearing on the question of the delivery
of the deed, presented a question of fact for determination by the trial court."
The principal difference in the Longley case and the case before this Court is that the Longley case was tried by the
Court, but the Court no doubt treated the matter of the delivery as a matter of law and not of equity. On the other
hand, Mr. Young assumes without argument in his brief
that this is a case in equity and not at law.
Under his argument on Point 10, he states:
"As we have heretofore suggested, this being a suit in
equity, this Court has the duty to review the evidence
and to determine whether or not the findings are clearly
against the weight of the evidence.''
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In this assumption counsel is in error.
This Court held in the case of Babcock vs. Dangerfield,
94 P. 2d. 862, which was an action to try title to real property and quiet the title thereto, that the court committed
reversible error because it held the case to be one of equity
and the appellant was entitled to a jury and reversed the
case for that reason. As a matter of fact, as held in the
Babcock case, it is only necessary for the plaintiff to prove
a prima facie case; and when that is proved, the case is one
for the jury and it is reversible error to refuse a jury.
The court below adequately instucted the jury as to the
question of intention of a grantor upon the delivery of a
deed, stating in substance, (Instuction No. 5) with reference
to the 1943 deeds, that the question of delivery is essential
ly the matter of the intent of the grantor; and that the question to be determined by the jury was: Did Lorenzo W. Anderson intend to personally pass the title to the property by
the 1943 deeds to the grantees, and did he intend to divest
himself of any right to recall these deeds?
In the Minnesota case of Exsted vs. Exsted 117 A.L.R.
599, (279 N.W. 554) the Minnesota Court laid down the rule:
"If the deed was left with the register of deeds with the
intention of immediately investing title in Harry, and
with the intent of relinquishing control over it, then
there was a delivery of the deeds."
North Dakota has laid .down a similar rule found in Stark
vs. Wannemacher. This was a case involving .a conflict of
evidence as to the delivery and failure of consideration of a
promissory note. While the North Dakota Court does not
treat at length in the question of intention, it did hold that
the verdict of the jury as to the delivery was binding on the
Supreme Court where there was conflict in the evidence.
Now having treated first the matter that the jury was
the trier of the facts and that the Court so recognized them
as the trier of the facts and amply instructed them as to
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what their duties were in determining the questions of fact,
and the jury having so determined that the 1943 deeds were
valid and were actually delivered, let us review the cases and
the evidence in this connection.
The son Lorenzo testified that his father sent him a letter to South Dakota telling him that he had prepared deeds
conveying· the property away (Rec. 86). That Mr. Anderson came to St. Paul in O'ctober, 1944 and again told the son
Lorenzo about the deeds. That there was a considerable
discussion between the father and the son at said time; the
son advising him not to convey his property away unless he
made a deed reserving a life estate, or to make a will. :But
the father gave him his reasons for not wanting a life estate
and that he wanted no will because he had already disposed
of his property (Rec. 87 and 88); that his son's deed was
home in his desk; that he had given it to his daughter Marie
to deliver to him when he returned. Later, after the father
had made these statements, he introduces his son Lorenzo
to a· tenant by the name of Garfield and tells him that his
son Loren·zo is the owner of the farm, and that after Mr. Anderson dies that he will have to deal with the son Lorenzo
(Rec. 90). That when the son Lorenzo returned home in
1945, marie, who was entrusted with his deed did get the
deeds and show them to him and asked him if he wanted to
take his deed home and he .advises her that he would leave
it in the desk for safe keeping (Rec. 91 and 92). That he
returned again in 1946 and at this time the sister Marie was
suspicious of her brother George and asked her brother
Lorenzo to check her deed. That at that time he had a
convers.ation with her telling her that delivery was n1ighty
important and that his father had advised him that he had
delivered his deed to Marie for him, and that he asked her
at that time if that was a fact and that if it was not so, he
would have to talk the matter over with his father. That
she told him that the fnther had delivered the deed to her
for Lorenzo and gave it to him at that time (Rec. 94 and 95).
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That when the son Lorenzo 'vas home in the fall of 1946 and
the father was sick, that the father told Lorenzo to go with
his brother George and tell the tenant of the Christensen
place to get out because the home belonged to George and to
take the deed along to show him. (Rec. 98) .That the son
Lorenzo in July 16, 1947, received a letter (Exhibit L-7)
from Marie saying that the father was not too alert and that
George, her brother, was trying to take advantage and what
should they do. At that time Lorenzo phoned from California and told Marie to record both of their deeds at the
Court House and she promised to do it for him (Rec. 101103). That he returned again in August 1948 and at that
time she showed him the will that she claimed the father had
made out and that the deeds at that time had been taken out
of their usual place and put in a black book where the will
was, under Marie's control. That Lorenzo told Marie at
that time that the deeds are good and to let nothing happen
to them and she so promised (Rec. 104-106). That when
Lorenzo returned for the funeral the first words frof Marie
were to the effect that the father had given her Promontory
(Rec. 107).
The Court is invited to check the cross-examination
made by Mr. Young of the son Lorenzo. He was kept on the
stand for hours under a gruelling test and his testimony
under all of said cross-examination strengthened and improved his direct testimony as to these facts. The brother
George tetifies that he heard of the deeds about the same
time they were made, when the father was to his place for
supper (Rec. 219). That they returned to the house and
there were three deeds laying on the table. The father explained what they contained and then handed his deed to him
and his wife and tells them that at that time that he is giving
it to them and that all he wants is the revenue and that they
could record it if they wished, but he would rather they
would not, but keep it in the family desk. (Rec. 220). He
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had already explained to his son George on previous occasions the necessity of parting with the deed to complete the
delivery (Rec. 221 and 222). At the time the son George
was about to go into the Armed Services in 1944, he talked
with his father about what would happen to his interest if
he died (Rec. 223) and his father said his wife would get it.
And in 1946, when George decided to return to Brigham City
his father tells him to get his deed and. show it to the tenant
who was living in the Christensen place and tell the tenant
to move that it was his property (Rec. 225). That because
of the fact that numerous expenses would be involved in remodeling the house he talked to his father about recording
the deed and together they determined that two new deeds
should be made up, one on Promontory and one on the house.
He could record the one on the house at that time and the
other deed would be kept back with the deed of the other
brother Loren'zo and his sister Marie, and be recorded after
the death of Mr. Anderson (Rec. 226). That two new deeds
were made out and both delivered to him and the sister
Marie witnessed them (R~ec. 227). That the deed was actually handed to him and taken into his possession (Rec.
228) and the deed to the Christensen place is still in existence and was offered in as Exhibit L-24 and shows Marie
appearing as a witness. That he saw this deed in the desk
several times later (Rec. 231, 232 and 233). That he rereceived a G.I. Farm in Idaho and had to sell the house in
which he was living in and move to Idaho and did not again
return after the fall of 1948 until the father's death. That
when he returned from the funeral and met Marie, the first
thing she said is that she has obtained Promontory (Rec.
238).
Again on cross-examination, Mr. Young, with all the
power at his command attempted to tear that story apart.
George again explained how he received the deed (Rec. 244)
for the year 1943 and how the fa thr wished that he wouldn't
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record it (Rec. 246). Why the two deeds were given when
he took over the Christensen place to live in (Rec. 248). On
re-direct examination he \vas asked on page 256 of the record, if he knew what had become of the deeds and he said
that Marie told him that she had burned them. Mr. Anderson's sister Edna Demars tells of a conversation with her
brother, where he told her "This is the way I have divided
my property" (Rec. 439). That his brother in law, Ellis
Demars tells of a conversation where his brother in law, Mr.
Anderson, told him that he was going to deed his property
to his children (Rec. 268) and then later told him that he
had so deeded the property to his children (Rec 268). Mr.
Demars also told of a conversation with him (Rec. 277) that
took place either in April or May of 1949, some two or three
months after the purported 1949 deeds were made out,
where Mr. Anderson said that his property was still the
same as when he had first made his deeds out.
Then, the positive testimony of the actual delivery of
the deed to George. And the actual fact of delivery to the
son Lorenzo by the father to Marie and Marie to Lorenzo we
have a conflict arise by lVIarie saying that she did not know
of her father signing the deeds in March of 1943 (Rec. 346)
and then saying (Rec. 347) he told her about the deed on
just one occasion. That he showed it to her but never gave
it to her and denies that he ever gave her Lorenzo's deed
(Rec. 347). But on page 348 she says: "I was told not to
record them until after he died." She admits that her
brother Lorenzo came in June 1945 and looked at the deeds,
but can remember of no conversation. He came again in
1946, but she can't remember any conversation (R:ec. 352),
but says that there was a daughter's deed there in the drawer and maybe there was a conversation about taking the
daughter's deed to California, but she doesn't kno\v (Rec.
353). She admitted that her brothers Lorenzo and George
went out to the C·hristensen place with George's deed and
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told the tenant to get out (Rec. 355) and she admitted that
she was a witness on the Christensen deed, but can't remember of any other deed (Rec. 356) and then .denies that she
saw any delivery of the deed (Rec. 357). She admits the will
of July 24, 1947 (Rec. 361) and denies that she had anything
to do with the making of the will (Rec. 362). Denies that
she talked with Attorney William E. Davis about any of the
provisions of the will (Rec. 362) and denies that she was
present when Mr. Davis and her father talked together
(Rec. 362). Admits that Mr. Davis delivered the will and
handed it to her to read (Rec. 363). Says her father executed the new deeds in February of 1949 and knew exactly
how he was dressed that day (Rec. 372) .and that his mind
was alright (Rec. 372). That there were two deeds made
in February of 1949, one for Lorenzo and that Lorenzo was
not to get it before the father died (Rec. 373) and that her
deed was hers (Rec. 373). Admits that she gave Lorenzo's
deed on the Garland property signed in 1949 to Attorney
George M. Mason (Rec. 374). Then on Rec. 376 she claimed the father went through the papers and got the deeds and
the will and gave them to her and said to put them in the
stove and burn them. On cross-examination (Rec. 390)
she was asked if she knew what the will was going to contain. She alleged she did not until after it was made out
and Attorney Davis brought it back. In Rec. 392 she was
shown Exhibit L-1 which was an instrument in Marie's
handwriting that she herself had taken to Attorney William
E. Davis to show him how the will should be made and was
dated July 23, 1947. She admitted that it was in her handwriting and said the date was wrong. On Rec. 393 she said
it was her handwriting but the "23rd" was not and that she
had copied that off the will after the will had been made up
and delivered. On Rec. 394 this will was gone into piece
meal, showing that it \vas one person writing about another
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person's property for the benefit of a third person. She
'\Vas asked again on Rec. 395, if she did not take that paper
to Attorney Davis, but she denied it and said she thought
she sent it to Lorenzo. Her evasive ability as a witness
is very cleverly shown on the Rec. 397 a.nd 398 and then
in Rec. 400 she was asked why did lVIr. Davis give her the
will to read? Was it because she had been in to see him
about it, and for the first time she started to break down
and said "maybe so." She admitted a conversation (Rec.
400) over the telephone with her brother Lorenzo where she
had promised to record his deed. On Rec. 405 she finally
broke clear down and admitted that she had delivered Exhibit L-1 (the instructions for the will) to Attorney Wiliam E. Davis. The defendant Marie offered in E,xhibit L-c
being a lease purportedly dated the 22nd day of December,
1944, between her father and her husband and she acted as
a witness. The plaintiffs' denied the date upon the contract
and offered in their Exhibit L-2 'vhich is a letter postmarked January 2, 1945, and talks about Marie and her husband
wanting to rent property and machinery if the draft board
didn't take him and telling that they have taken down the
christmas tree. This was offered for the purpose of showing that any agreement was back-dated.
As far as the delivery of the deeds was concerned, the
above is the evidence that was presented to the jury. They
had been instructed by Instruction No. 12 (Rec. 31):
"You are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact
of the credibility of witnesses. In judging of
their credibility you have the right to take into consideration their deportment on the witness stand, their interest, if any is shown, the result of the suit, the reasonableness of their statements, their apparent frankness or candor, or want of it; their opportunities to
know and understand,' and their capacity to remember.
You have the right to consider any fact or circumstance
in evidence which in your judgment affects the credibility of any witness. If you beleve from the evi33
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dence that any witness who has testified in this case
has knowingly and willfully testified falsely to any Inaterial fact in this case, you may disregard the whole
testimony of such witness, unless the witness is corroborated by other creditable evidence or you n1ay give
such weight to the evidence of such witness on other
points as you may think it entitled to; the jury are the
exclusive judges of the weight of the testimony. - - "
In this ·case they found the witness Marie very evasive.
She denied emphatically the very important document of the
preparation of the will until her back was· to the wall and
then turned around and admitted under oath that her fornler testimony was wrong. She even said that she had never
told her Dad about George selling the Christensen place
(Rec. 419) yet on re-cross examination and when she was
shown her own letter (Exhibit L-36) she did admit that she
had told her Dad that George had sold the Christensen place
and that she did that when George, she thought, was trying
to take some ad ventage of her. (Rec. 522).
Mr. Young says in his brief (page 37) :
"This latter statement impels us to interject one other
strong bit of evidence of non-delivery. The record
stands undisputed that after signing the 1949 deeds the
grantor went to his desk, went through all of his deeds
and the will and directed Marie to burn the same as they
were no longer of any force."
This was the testimony of Marie alone. It is not corroborated. The Jury had watched and seen her testify and had
seen her forced to change her testimony, aft·er giving it under oath. They were the exclusive judges of her credibility
and by their determination they evidently considered such
statement to be of no more value than the statement first
made, that she had not prepared and delivered written instructions to Attorney William E. Davis for the preparation
of the father's will and then when forced with the fact that
the attorney would be called, she changed her whole testimony and admitted it.
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The evidence shows and is uncontradicted that in both
the case of Lorenzo and George, they actually had in their
own possession, the 1943 deeds that were executed. by their
father. There is very interesting Iaw in this regard. which
is found in Chamberlin et al, vs. Larsen et al, 29. Pac. 2d
355, Utah 1934:
Sadie B. Bennett and Josephine Fortune were sisters
and lived in a house and lot in Salt Lake City; the title being in Bennett. Bennett died on January 15th, 1928, and
Fortune died March 1928. On January 24th, 1928, a deed
was recorded to Fortune dated January 27th, 1921. In February Mrs. Fortune had an accident that disabled her and a
party by the name of Larsen came to live with her and take
care of her in consideration of the deed conveying the property, with Mrs. Fortune retaining a life estate.
This action was brought by the heirs of Miss Bennett
to set aside the deed to Mrs. Fortune, claiming non-delivery
and that Larsen had no rights.
The lower court held the non-delivery of the deed. The
facts showed that Bennett and Fortune had a joint deposit
box and the deed was in the box. Also that no entry slips
were signed by Mrs. Fortune for admission to the box prior
to Miss Bennett's death, but showed that Mrs. Fortune came
to the bank with Miss Bennett occasionally. The contents
of the box showed only papers of Miss Bennett but none of
Mrs Fortune, other than th·e deed.
The deed was made by an attorney who was also a real
estate man and thought both sisters were present at the time
the deed was made. Mrs. Fortune could not hear because
of a slight defect in hearing. At the same time the assignment of mortgage was made to Mrs. Fortune, papers and
deed were given back to Miss :Bennett after they were completed and the assignment kept in the box, but released two
years later by Miss Bennett who had given the assignment.
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Testimony after deed was made - Miss Bennett wished
to sell property. The taxes were paid by Miss .Bennett.
Conversation between lVIiss Bennett and others - if Miss
Bennett died first the property to go to Mrs. Fortune.
Conversation with Mrs. Fortune after Miss .Bennett's death,
where Mrs. Fortune does not appear to know she owns property. One witness testifies that prior to Miss Bennett's
death, she asked a party to go with l\irs. Fortune, if Miss
Bennett died, to see that her deed was recorded. She doubted if Mrs. Fortune knew what to do.
Testimony at the time the box was opened, after the
death of Miss ,Bennett showed that Mrs. Fortune got her
deed and recognized it. This testimony was given by Larsen
the defendant.
Neighbors testified that Miss Bennett told them that
she had given Josie, that is Mrs. Fortune, a deed for the
property and all she had to do after her death was to put it
on record. (See cross examination page 360, left hand
column).
In F·ebruary 1928, Mrs. Fortune was injured and called
the doctor and tol him she had received a deed from her sister and wanted to give the property to Larsen (see balance
of statement 360 right column). The doctor got a lawyer
who fixed up the papers.
See the court's statement regarding the release of the
mortgage that had~ been assigned, page 361, where the court
says:
"Nor do we think that the release of the mortgage by
the record holder thereof is much, if any, evidence, of
the non-delivery of the unrecorded assignment thereof,
particularly in view of the relationship existing between
the assignor and the assignee."
Now at the bottom of page 361 we come to the very
question before this court. Both of the boys have had actual possession of their deeds and defendants aunlit it, but
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claim non-delivery.

At the bottom of page 361 we have:

"The rule seems to be well settled that a deed duly executed and acknowledged and shown to be in the possession of the grantee, is self-proving both as to execution and delivery and that the recording of a deed is
likewise evidence of delivery."
It is thus stated in Devlin on Deeds 3d ed. Art. 294 page 362:
"The possession of a deed duly executed in the hands of
the grantee, is prima facie, but not conclusive evidence
of its delivery. It therefore follows that he who disputes this presumption has the burden of proof and
must show that there has been no delivery. And not
only must this presumption be overcome, but it is held
there is a strong implication that it has been delivered when it is found in the hands of the grantee that only
strong evdence can refute the presumption."
Mr. Young is now trying to shift the burden of nondelivery in such a way that he is willing to say "even if we
take it for full value, that is, that they had these deeds in
their hands, that doesn't amount to anything. They must
prove more because the father kept possession of the pro})erty. The deeds were in a desk that all had acc,ess to. He
paid the taxes. He conveyed some other property away to
grandchildren and recorded those deeds and he made a lease
with one of his children."
Now back to this case. This court should examine the
left side of page 362, where a great many cases are cited in
support of the above and then it enters into the proposition
of "presumption" and quotes certain text writers and in this
regard at the bottom of page 362 says:
"The author draws the distinction that a presumption
of law is in reality a rule in some particular branch of
the substantive law, a general maxim of jurisprudence,
or an assumption by the court of the existence of a fact
not proven in order to facilitate and expedite judicial
action."
And then a full paragraph follows, showing how the presumption comes into being and is applied and then says:
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'Tested by these principles, we think the evidence of the
plaintiffs insufficient to sustain the burden of proof and
establish the non-delivery of the deed in question. The
testimony of Mr. Fletcher who took the acknowledgment and witnessed the deed, that after taking the acknov;ledgment he handed the deed to Miss Bennett,
did not show the non-delivery. Nor, indeed, would it
have had that effect had he testified positively that he
did not then see the deed delivered." Thompson vs.
McK·enna, 22 Cal. App. 129, 133 P. 512.
The statement by the grantor of her purpose in making
the deed: 'To take care of any future trouble in the
event that Miss Bennett died before Mrs. Fortune,' did
not show non-delivery of the deed. Ehrlicj vs. Tritt,
Supra.
Indeed, in this respect the present case is not unlike that
of Jackson vs. LaMar, 58 Washington, 383, 108 P. 946,
948, where the court said:
"A mere statement of the grantor that he wanted his
brother to have his interest in the property in case he
passed on, to keep him from being annoyed by the heirs
in the east, has no tendency to establish a non-delivery
of the deed, or to overcome the presumption arising
from its possession by the grantee."
Nor was the fact that the deed was kept until after the
death of Miss Bennett in a box to which both she and
Mrs. Fortune had access, any evidence of non-delivery.
Reed vs. Smith 125. Gal 491 58 P. 139; Le Saulnier vs.
Loew 53 Wis. 207, N.W. 145 Wilson vs. Wilson 32 Utah,
169, 89 Pac 643.
That the grantor, after the execution of the deed, continued to pay the taxes on the property, carried the
insurance in her name and expressed to various persons
a desire· to sell part or all of the property is not, when
the relationship existing between the grantor and the
grantee is taken into consideration, inconsistent with
the actual delivery of the deed. - - - . This is not a case
of a grant to a stranger where the grantor remained in
possession and continued to pay taxes, etc., and we think
such conduct is in no respect inconsistent with a prior
delivery of the deed to the grantee, and that it is no
evidence of non-delivery. Woolley vs. Taylor 45. Utah
227 144 Pac. 1094; White vs. Smith Supra; Stewart vs.
Silva Supra."
Again we find on page 364, this :
"We have in this respect considered only the evidence
:38
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tending to support the finding of non-delivery. There
is in the record also evidence affirmatively tending to
show delivery .of the deed. We may say, in this case,
as was said by the court in the Stewart vs. Silva, Supra:
'The situation presented by this appeal may be summed
up as follows: If the trial court dis-believed all the
witnesses who testified on behalf of the defendant, with
reference to the delivery of the deed, there is no evidence to overcome the presumption of delivery derived
from the fact that the grantee had possession of the
deed. If the trial court believed the testimony of these
witnesses, it could not escape the finding of fact that the
deed was delivered. In either event the finding of the
trial court was erroneous."
As a consequence the Supreme Court reversed the trial
court who had found that there was no delivery of the deed
and directed the trial court to enter findings to the effect
that there had been a delivery. Consequently we say that
the evidence having shown a delivery to George and his wife
and the possession of the deed by them at a certain time and
the evidence having shown further, that after the father
told Lorenzo that Marie would give him his deed and Marie
did give it to him, the delivery was consumated and the presumption then arises that the delivery was valid and it is
upon the party who claims non-delivery to prove the nondelivery and the presumption of delivery will not be refutted except on testimony that is clear and convincing, that the
fact of the deed was where both parties had access to it,
would not be such evidence. The fact that Mr. Ande·rson
continued to pay taxes on the property would not be such
evidence. The fact that he made a lease to one of the children to keep them out of the army would not be such evidence of non delivery. All because of the relationship
which existed between the father and the children. Other
cases holding this to be the law are cited under Thompson
on R~al Property under Art. 4120 page 572 and are as follows: Stewart vs. Silva 192 Cal. 405, 221 Pac. 191; Ephraim
vs. Oakland Title Insurance and Guarantee Co., 54 Cal. App.
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379, 201 Pac. 946; Hodoian vs. Garabedian, 79 Cal. App. 762
251 Pac. 227; Patterson vs. McClenatham, 296 Til, 475, 129
NE 767; Qwinn vs. Hobbs 83 Ind. App. 263, 141 NE 812, 141
NE 648; Partello vs. White 197 Iowa 24, 196 NW 719; Vernon vs. Vernon 211 Ky 196 277 SW 248; Mason vs. Mason
231 SW 971; Clark vs. Holmes 109 Neb 213, 190 NW 493;
In Re Cragins Estate, 274 Pol 117 Atlanta 445; Heck vs.
Morgan 88W. :Va. 102, 106 SE 413
Mr. Young might claim, and he has definitely inferred,
that the getting of the deeds by Marie and delivering them
to Lorenzo on two different occasions was not a delivery by
the father, and then he states that Marie has denied any delivery to her. The jury was the judge of whether or not
Marie was inclined to tell the truth. The father's lips have
been sealed in death, but before they were sealed he told
others, the Demars, that he had divided his property. He
told his son Lorenzo that he had made the deeds, conveying
one third to him and that Marie had his deed and would give
it to him. Lorenzo asked Marie for it and she went and got it.
She knew exactly where it was and it is the province of the
jury to take these facts and hold that the father had delivered the deed to Marie for her other brother. And naturally we come to this proposition, if this is a fact, that the
father delivered the deed to Marie to deliver to Lorenzo, is
this a good deli very? Thompson on Real Property, his permanent edition, Art. 4133 page 593, says'
"TO WHOM DELIVERY MAY BE MADE IN GENERAL.-It is not essential that the delivery be to the grantee himself. It may be made to the grantee's agent,
and even to a third person who is not his agent, for the
grantee's use, provided the grantee afterwards assents
to the deed or receives it."

And then it cites cases from the United States and Federal
Reports, two from California, one from Connecticut, seven
from Illinois, five from Indiana, one from lo\\·a, four from
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Kentucky, one from Maryland, four from Mass, two from
Michigan, three from Minnesota, one from Nebraska, three
from New Hampshire, one from New Jersey, six from New
York, one from North Carolinia, one from N. Dakota, one
from Ohio, one from Oregon, two from Penn, one from South
Carolina, and two from Texas and then a line of English
cases.
I ask this, did Lorenzo assent to the delivery of the deed?
He most certainly did, he even phoned from California and
told Marie to put it on record and she promised that she
would and there is no testimony in the record that at the
time she told him she would put it on the record that she
argued or attempted to argue with him and tell him that the
father had not delivered it to her, for him, and that it was
not his. But on the contrary, indulged in every cooperative measure to lead one to believe that her thinking was
that it was Lorenzo's deed and that he had a right to direct
what should be done with it.
Another very interesting case was Robertson et al vs.
Renshaw et al, Whitney Intervenor, Supreme Court of Iowa,
June 21st, 1935, 261 NW 645. The facts in this case are:
That the mother who owned certain property prior to her
death, went down to her lawyer and had three seperate
deeds made out to a part of her children and placed them in
her own safety deposit box in the bank, and then told neighbors that she had conveyed her property to her children and
that the children never seeing the deeds, or having them
delivered to them, prior to her death, but after her death
taking the keys to her box and going down and getting the
deeds and recording them. Then another daughter brings
this action to have the deeds set aside. The case was tried
upon these facts, that is, that the deeds were in the safety
deposit box and that possession of them was obtained by the
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grantees, after the death of the grantor, getting them into
their possession through opening he box. There was no
proof of non-delivery offered by the plaintiff and the court
said on page 648:
"There is considerable confusion in the pronouncement
of this Court on the question of what is necessary to
constitute delivery of a deed. All authorities agree
that to make a warranty deed effective, a delivery is
necessary. It is equally clear by all the authorities that
where a deed is signed, acknowledged, and recorded, the
law presumes that it has been delivered. (The recording in this case was after the death of the grantorthis notation is mine.) This presumption is, of course,
a rebuttable presumption and may be overcome by any
competent or satisfactory evidence to the contrary.
Stiles vs. Breed, 151 Iowa, 86, 90, 130 NW RNW 376;
Brown vs. Johnson Iowa 255 NW 862. The settled rule
of evidence in this state is that one seeking to set aside
such a deed, which is shown to hav-e been signed, acknowledged and recorded, has the burden of showing
non delivery by proof that is clear and satisfactory and
this true, even though the recording is after the death
of the grantor."
There are a line of cases which .are given thereafter. Then
on the left hand column of page 649 they go into the premise that delivery is a matter of intent and how it may be affected, and towards the bottom of the page it says:
"In final analysis it may be said that delivery is a matter of intent and any distinct act or word by the grantor
with intent o pass the title to the_grantee, by transferring the deed to him or to another for his benefit is a delivery."
In this case the presumption of delivery was with the parties
who had the deed in their possession and had recorded it and
that the court held that the other party, not overcoming
that presumption could not prevail. This is the same as we
have. 'Ve show that the deed was in the possession of our
parties at different times. The presumption was not overcome by any testimony of the defendant~, Johnsons; Marie
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herself destroyed the deed, the father didn't. So in this
case, the presumption being ':vith us that delivery was made
and the intention being clearly shown of the grantor to part
with the title and the fact that he told it to neighbors, has
not been overcome and the jury has so determined.
The California case of Blackledge vs. Mcintosh 259
Pac. 770 is an interesting case for the reason that there we
have a desk involved, similar to what we have in this case.
The facts are, that the mother who was a widow lived with
her daughter who was single and after going down and having the deeds made out to her daughter brought the,m home
and the daughter is the one who testifies about the delivery
and no one else. She testifies that the mother gave her the
deeds and that she put them in a roll-top desk that was in
the mother's house, in one of the drawers where they had
kept other business papers. When they moved again this
desk was put in "Mama's room" which has a striking similarity to the desk in question in the Anderson vs. Johnson
case, and both had access to it until after the death of the
mother. The mother told to friends and neighbors that she
was going to convey the property to her daughter and that
she had conveyed the property and they testified at the
hearing. There was understanding between the mother
that that deed should not be recorded and that the daughter
could have the rents and income if she remained single. Then
the court commenting upon this said, in the right hand
column, page 773
"The foregoing decisions afford ample authority for the
holding that any oral agreement or understanding of
Mrs. Mcintosh (Mother) may have had with her daughter that the deed should not be recorded until after
death, and that the daughter should only have the rents
and income from the property so long as she remained
single and was in need of such income, is immaterial and
would have no effect upon the delivery, because the
43
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deeds were absolute in form and could not be delivered
to the grantee conditionally. Delivery to her is necessarily adsolute, and the instrument took effect imtnediately, discharged of any condition on which delivery
was made, not expressed in the instruments themselves."
Again over on page 772 in the right hand column we had
something in that case that is in ours, and that is this:
"The evidence in this case also shows that Mrs. McIntosh, after the execution of these deeds, paid the taxes
upon the property herself, and appeared in an action
involving one of the pieces of pro_2erty as legal owner
thereof; collected rents from some of the properties ;
made repairs and improvement upon another piece of
property; made returns to the assessor for assessment
purposses as the legal owner of the property, etc."
"All these facts, while tending to show a continuing
claim of title by Mrs. Mcintosh (Mother) to the property theretofore conveyed to the defendant, were merely
circumstances to be weighed by the trial court against
the affirmative evidence of delivery given by the defendant. These facts, taken with other facts testified
to by the defendant and her witnesses, did no more than
raise a conflict of evidence on the vital issues of the
sufficiency of the delivery of the deeds to pass title to
the defendants, and, the trial court having resolved
that confict in favor of the defendant, such finding will
not be disturbed by this court where there is any substantial evidence to support it."
Again in this case the deed stayed in the possession of
the grantor so to speak, by being in the dek in the same manner as it was in the Anderson case and Thompson on Real
Property, Art. 4144 page 604 says:
"The fact that a deed remains in the grantor's possession will not prevail over the fact that the parties intended that it should be considered as delivered."
and they cite the following cases: Arkansas, Lee HardVi7are Co., vs. Johnson 132 Ark 432, 201 SW 289; Marvin vs.
Simpson 23, Colorado 174, 46 Pacific 73, Illinois Prince vs .
.Prince 258 Ill, 304, 101 NE 608; Little vs. Eaton 267 Ill 623
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108 NE 727; .Balin vs. Osoba 76 Kansas 234 91 Pac. 57, Ky
Higgins vs. Gose 144 ICy 123, 137 SW 1038, Mississippi, Wall
vs. Wall 30 Miss. 91 64 AM. Dec. 147; Henry V. Phillips 105
Tex 459, 151 SW 533; Thatcher vs. Capeca 75 Washington,
249, 134 Pac. 923. And again in Thom.pson on Real Property Art. 4144 page 608, where the delivery is complete, the
return of the deed to the grantor does not re-invest him with
title. And besides quoting the Blackledge vs. Mcintosh 259
Pac. 770 quoted above, they also quote Garrett vs. Lion ·Oil
and Refining Company 173 Ark. 429 92 SW 405; Chestnut
vs. Cobb 163, Georgie 87, 135 SW 433; Johnson vs. Fleming
301, Ill, 139, 133 NE 667; Burnett vs. Burnett 194 Ky 635,
240 SW 75; Emerson-Srandingham Implement COmpany vs.
Cook 165 Minn 198, 306 NW 170, 43 ALR 41.
And this
same Art. No. 4144 in Thompson, continues with the following:
"If a deed is delivered to the grantee it takes effect from
such delivery, though it be afterwards handed back to
the maker for a specific purpose, for instance, for safe
keeping during the grantee's minority, to obtain a release of dower by the maker's wife, to have it acknowledged or recorded, or to correct an ir.formality in it;
delivery is not invalidated thereby A court of equity,
on the ground of a trust, may decree a restoration of a
deed, or, if the deed has been destroyed, it may decree
the execution of a good and sufficient conveyance of the
premises. If there has been a delivery, the grantee in
trust cannot be defeated by the grantors obtaining possession of the deed in any way. . Or by his state subsequent declaration that there has been no delivery. The
fact that the deed was kept in a safety deposit box
which both the grantor and the grantee kept their
papers, did not operate to destroy its effect, if it was
actually delivered by the grantor into the manual possession of the grantee."
·
In 26 C. J. S. page 239, we have:
"Where the grantor reserves a life estate in the property and its possession and control, his retention of the
deed is not inconsistent with the idea that a delivery
was intended."
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In 26 C. J. S. 239 we have:
"The fact that, after a deed has geen delivered by the
grantor to the grantee, the latter returns it to the former merely for the perfomance of some act in connection therewith does not negative the previous delh·ery
or operate as a surrender of the title thereby acquired.
So, the delivery is not necessarily invalidated by the fact
that the grantor acts as a depositary for the grantee,
as where the deed is returned to him for safe-keeping,
or that he has access to the place where the deed is kept,
or that it is kept with his private papers."
In 26 C.J.S. page 247 we have:
"Likewise, a deed is not rendered inoperative by the fact
that it is delivered under a contemporaneous agreement
that it is not to be recorded until the grantor's death,
(Knudson vs. Adams, 30 P. 2d 608, 137 Cal. Ap 261) or
that the grantor is to retain possession of the property
during his lifetime."

The cas,e of Merritt vs. Rey, 104 Cal App 702, 286 Pacific 510 and on page 512 in the right hand column we have:
"There is now in America no legal obstruction to the
conveying of title to real property which is to be enjoyed by the grantee only at the death of the grantor.
Under such circumstances the grantor will be regarded
as presently conveying the title subject to the reservation of a life estate therein. Section 767, Civ. Code;
Ripperdan vs. Weldy, 149 Cal 667, 674, 87 P. 276; 1 Tiffany on Real Property (2nd Ed) p, 551, Art. 159.
While oral testimony is admissable for the purpose of
determining the intent with which the grantor relinquished her custody of the deed (Williams vs. Kidd, 170
Cal. 631, 151 P. 1, Ann, Cas 1916E, 703; Holoian vs.
Garabedian, 79 Cal. Ap 762, 769, 251 P. 227), after the
delivery of the deed has been adequately shown, the
grantee takes the title free from all conditions which arP.
not expressed therein (Mowry vs. Heney, 86 Cal. App
475, 483, 259 P. 770; Weldon vs. Lawrenc, 76 Cal. App.
530, 535, 245 P. 451). While it was, therefore, proper
to consider the reservation by the grantor of the use
and benefits derived from the property during her
lifetime in order to determine whether she intended to
presently pass the title to the grantee, this situation is
not necessarily in conflict \Vith the theory of an absolute conveyance of title, and is insufficient upon to
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upset the findings of the court to the effect that title
did not pass to the respondent. Nor is the fact that the
grantor assumed the right to subsequently mortgage
this property upon several occasions inconsistent with
the absolute transfer of the title. There was no legal
obstacle to the grantor mortgaging her life interest.''
In the case of .lVIcC!arthy vs. Security Trust, 188 Cal 229,
204 P. 818, left hand column and on page 820, we have:
"The oral request of the grantor that a deed be notrecorded until after her death does not defeat a delivery
otherwise effective."
In Drummond vs. Drummond, 39 Cal. Ap. 2d. 418, 103 P.
217. Here the grantor executed and recorded deeds to children without delivery of them. Held manual delivery of a
deed to grantee not essential to passing title, but delivery
and acceptance of a deed may be manifested by the declaration, acts and conduct of the parties. The Court then went
on to say on page 228 in the left hand column:
"When the execution and delivery of a deed with the intention of thereby conveying title to the grantee is
satisfactorily established, neither the subsequent collection of rental therefrom the mortg~ging of the property without the knowlegge or consent of the grantee,
nor the attempt to convey it to another person, will
vitiate the title of the grantee."
See also Longley vs. Brooks, Cal. 92 P. 2d 394. See the left
hand column on page 398 where the court quotes the testimony relied on by it. There the grantor kept the deed
and exercised control over the property during her lifetime
as if it was still hers. The grantor, deceased, paid the taxes
during her lifetime and rented the property to other parties and collected the rents and attended to other business
matters relating to the property.
See also, Shaver vs. Canfield, Cal 70 P. 2d 507. In this case
we have several interesting facts. The deeds were retained
in a steel box in grantor's room and under his control. The
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grantor passed the deeds to the grantee, and then kept them
himself in his own box. This is similar to the incident of
"laying on of hands" as we have in our case. The only testimony in the Shaver case is by the grantee and her witnesses. See the observations of the court as to decided cases
at the top of right column on page 509. See also the Brandt
case, Brandt vs. Brandt, 260 P. 2d 342. This is a very instructive case because there the question arose about testimony purporting to quote the deceased as having said "that
he was going to 'leave' his property to the grantee to avoid
probate." The same contention was there made as is made
by Mr. Young i. e., that this was therefore an attempted
testamentary devise. In the right hand column, page 343,
the grantor, after execution of deeds in question made five
different mortgages on the same property and even made a
subsequent deed of the same property to the same grantee. ·
The court upheld the deeds.
In order to show that other states hold the same as California, we turn to Oklahoma, Dimler vs Dimler, 32 P. 2d 876.
This case was between a father and daughter and the facts
are a striking example when compared to ours. The father
went to an attorney and told him to prepare a deed in his
daughter's name and that he was "going to deed" the property to his daughter. Then he took the deed home and told
her about it and that "it was for her eighteenth birthday."
He claimed that he put the deed in a box to which they both
had access. She claimed that he passed the deed to her and
she put it in the box to which they both had access (his
box). Both claimed that it was to be held until his death
before recording. She got the d.eed when she went away to
school without his knowledge and recorded it. He did not
find it out until he went to have the property mortgaged
and only then found that the deed had been recorded. He
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brought an action to set aside the deed. The court held the
evidence sufficient to sustain the deed. In that case there
was not even the evidence of a sister like Mrs. Demars, who
told "how he had conveyed his property.'' This is not meant
to be literal, but to impress the court with the fact that she
positively testified in the past tense.
Another case that bears on the question of "laying on of
hands", which lVIr. Young uses in such an odd manner is a
Kansas case of Foresman vs. Foresman 175 P. 983. Here the
grantor made a deed to his son, put it in his hand and Immediately took it back to keep himself until he died. See the
testimony of the wife, left column page 986, where she testified that her husband had told her that he had given the
son the deed. Actually the husband let the son have it in
his hand and then took it back. There is no more force in
this than the statement made by Mr. Anderson to Mrs.
Demars, not as much in fact, because Mr. Anderson explained in detail the proportions in which he had conveyed his
property. He told Lorenzo in the Midwest that he had conveyed his property and Lorenzo advised him against this
method and tried to get him to make deeds with a life estate retained. The father insisted on his own method. The
Kansas Court upheld the deeds.
A very recent and interesting case involving the destruction of a deed by the grantor where he had possession
of it, and on sufficiency of the evidence, is found in Chaffee
vs. Sorensen, Cal. 236 P 2d. 851. The only evidence of delivery was that grantor told his attorney to make a deed and
"give it Alice.'' He signed the deed and said "there."
Later he got the deed among some other papers and destroyed the deed. It seems that the destruction was not intended but the court said:
"If he had expressly requested it the legal situation
would not be altered. Re-delivery of a deed to the gran49
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tor does not amount to a re-conveyance of title, even
though it is delivered with the intent that the grantor
cancel it."
The California case said another very striking thing, which
perhaps all of us have overlooked in this case:
"Inasmuch as Chaffee was making a gift of his interest in the property to his daughter we do not expect to
find the presence of the same formalities as if it had
been a transaction in which one person was selling
property to another for a cash consideration."
We believe that the .above statement is certainly· applicable to ours, both as to the statement made to George when
the deceased had George and his wife take and handle the
deeds to signify delivery and to Lorenzo in the east.
We want to call the Court's attention at this point
to the fact that Marie has testified that her father
told her to destroy the 1943 deeds. Marie and her husband
and their lawyer all contend that Mr. Anderson was mentally
competent at this time. If their contention is correct why
did not the deceased destroy them himself? The obvious
answer is that they had already been delivered and Mr. Anderson knew this to be the fact many years before and furthermore, the jury found him to be incompetent at that time
and if he did tell Marie to destroy the deeds, he was not cognizant of his direction. We do not believe he told Marie to
destroy them. If he had done so in his right mind and not
under duress or undue influence, he certainly would have
either told his sons what he had done, or told Marie to do
so. Everyone that has had anything to do with this case
has been impressed with the fairness of Mr. Anderson.
Even when we give Marie the benefit of any doubts in this
case, we find that when she went to Attorney William E.
Davis to get him to draw a will, with directions in Marie's
own handwriting (there is nothing here to indicate that Mr.
50

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Anderson gave any directions), we find that he only gave
the Johnsons the right to buy Promontory. He did not give
it to them. But this was not good enough for Marie and she
kept working on ''her project" of a continual whittling down
of the boy's interests until she got her father to sign the
final and concluding "coup de grace."
CONCLUSION
In conclusion we say:

1. That whether or not the 1943 deeds were delivered
by the father to the children is a legal question. The jury
having resolved this question ~n favor of the plaintiffs, it
then becomes the duty of this court on appeal to determine
whether or not the decision made by he trial court and jury
finds support in evidence. If there is competent credible
evidence to support the finding made by the trial court and
jury, those findings should stand. (Words used from Buckey vs. Cox, No. 7730 in green sheets) .
2. That the great weight of the evidence is that the 1943
deeds were delivered.
3. That the undisputed evidence is, that the deeds were
actually in the possession of the grantees, the plaintiff's
herein, after they were executed. That a legal presumption then arises from the fact of said possession that a delivery has been consumated. That the burden of proving
that no delivery has taken place is then upon the party who
might deny delivery. That said proof must be clear and
convincing. That the defendants have offered no evidence
whatsoever to overcome this presumption.
4. That after the jury determined that there had been
a delivery of the 1943 deeds to the plaintiff's by their answer to interrogatory No. 1, the answers to interrogatories
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2 and 3-were of no value to the court, but the court having
failed to advise them that they need not answer interrogatories numbers 2 and 3, if their answers to No. 1 was "Yesn
no error was committed when they so answered No. 2 by
saying that a delivery of the 1949 deeds had taken place and
then answered No.3 by saying that he was not competent to
make said delivery and execute said deeds at said time for
the reasons:
a. That the evidence shows conclusively that from the
time of his first sickness he progressively deteriorated in
both mind and body until his death.
b. That at or about the time of the making of the 1949
deeds he was trying to give away his valuable books, books
that he loved better than gold, and that the family humored
him by passing the books to the party that he might try to
give them to, while in his sight, and then take them away
from the party after he was out of the sight of the father.
c. That the daughter Marie had him dressed up special
for the execution of the deeds for the benefit of the party
who was called in to acknowledge them.
d. That previous to the time of the execution of the
1949 deeds at said time and up to his death he would not
recognize places or people, including his family or home, and
would develop a vacant expression. That when he was not
like this and appeared to be normal he acted abnormal by
wanting to give valuable property away as mentioned in
"b" above.
e. That he told his relatives after the execution of the
1949 deeds that his property was still divided in the sa1ne
manner as if it was by the execution and delivery of the 1943
deeds.
f. That the jury believing that interrogatories numbered 2 and 3 had to be answered could not from the evi52
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dence find otherwise than that the father signed and parted
with the deeds, but that he was incompetent and did not
know the effect of his act at the time. T'his was unnecessary after they had determined that there had been an actual
execution and delivery of the 1943 deeds.
5. That this court should affirm the findings of the
jury as well as the findings of fact, conclusions of law and
judgment and decree, entered pursuant thereto and grant
plaintiffs' and respondents' their costs herein.
Respectfully submitted,
Walter G. Mann
George D. Preston
Attorneys for plaintiffs
and respondents.
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